Epieikeia (ἐπιείκεια, leniency)

πιείκεια: Fairness and reasonableness governed by benevolence. A leniency that does not immediately insist on the letter of the Law or one’s rights.

(Acts 24:4)

Phil. 4:5

James 3:17

2 Cor. 10:1 (E. belongs to Christ)

Rom. 3:25

1 Tim. 3:3 (of ministers)

Titus 3:2 (of all Christians)

Eph. 4:2; Col. 3:13

1 Peter 2:18; 4:8

Ap. 4.242: Petrus igitur non hoc vult, quod dilectio coram Deo mereatur remissionem peccatorum, quod sit propitiatio excluso mediatore Christo, quod regeneret ac iustificet, sed quod erga homines non sit morosa, non aspera, non intractabilis, quod quaedam errata amicorum dissimulet, quod mores aliorum etiam asperiores boni consulat, sicut vulgaris quaedam sententia praecipit: Mores amici noveris, non oderis. Neque temere de hoc officio dilectionis toties praecipiunt apostoli, quod philosophi vocant ἐπιείκειαν. Necessaria est enim haec virtus ad publicam concordiam retinendam, quae non potest durare, nisi multa dissimulent, multa condonent inter se pastores et ecclesiae.

239 Therefore a little earlier (1 Pet. 2:4, 5) Peter commands us to come to Christ and to be built upon Christ, and he adds (1 Pet. 2:6), “He who believes in him will not be put to shame.” Our love does not free us from shame when God judges and accuses us, but faith in Christ frees us in the midst of these fears because we know that for Christ’s sake we are forgiven.

240 Furthermore, this statement about love is taken from Proverbs (10:12), where the antithesis clearly shows what it means: “Hatred stirs up strife, but love covers all offenses.”

241 It teaches exactly the same thing as Paul’s statement in Col. 3:13, namely, that if any dissensions arise they should be quieted and settled by calmness and forbearance. Dissensions, it says, grow because of hatred, as we often see the greatest tragedies come from the most trifling offenses. Between Gaius Caesar and Pompey certain minor disagreements arose, which would never have brought on civil war if either had yielded the least bit to the other.

242 When each one gave in to his hatred, a major commotion emerged from an insignificant issue. Many heresies have arisen in the church simply from the hatred of the clergy. This text therefore speaks not of one’s own sins but of other people’s when it says, “Love covers all offenses,” namely, other people’s offenses and offenses between people. Even though these offenses occur, love covers them up, forgives, yields, and does not go to the limit of the law.

Peter does not mean that love merits the forgiveness of sins in relation to God; that in place of Christ the mediator it is our propitiation; or that it regenerates and justifies. He means that in human relations it is not peevish, harsh, or implacable; that it covers up some of the mistakes of its friends; and that it puts the best construction even on the more offensive actions of others, as the common proverb says, “Know, but do not hate, the manners of a friend.” 243 It is not without reason that the apostles speak so often about this duty of love which the philosophers call “leniency.” This virtue is necessary for the preservation of domestic tranquillity, which cannot endure unless pastors and churches overlook and forgive many things.

WA 42:21

AE 29:75-75: We began to treat this word ἐπιεικής, gentle. This term is quite famous among the Greeks but not so famous among the Latins. I have pointed out an example from Acts, where Tertullus says “to hear us.” Jurists define it as equity, when on account of an intervening case they soften the rigor of the law. Aristotle says in the fifth book of his Ethics that when a legislator sets down a law, he makes a distinction: The law is impossible, because moral questions concern themselves with the person. Therefore the law can deal only with the general situation. The head of a household decides that his family should get up at the third hour. This is a general law. But a special case arises if someone in his family has a headache and cannot do this. If he is foolish, he pushes his way through and does not observe epieikeia. He does not soften the rigor of the law. This is what is meant by equity in moral laws.

Aristotle (Nic. Eth. 5.10): “This is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a rectification of law where law is defective because of its generality. In fact this is the reason why things are not all determined by law: it is because there are some cases for which it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a special ordinance becomes necessary… It is now plain what the equitable is, and that it is just, and that it is superior to one sort of justice. And from this it is clear what the equitable man is: he is one who by choice and habit does what is equitable, and who does not stand on his rights unduly, but is content to receive a smaller share although he has the law on his side. And the disposition described is Equity; it is a special kind of Justice, not a different quality altogether.

=aequum/aequitas; cf. clementia

Cicero (Inv. 2.164): clementia (est), per quam animi temere in odium alicujus concitati invectio comitate retinetur

Cicero (De off. 1.88): Nec vero audiendi qui graviter inimicis irascendum putabunt idque magnanimi et fortis viri esse censebunt; nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et praeclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. In liberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate exercenda etiam est facilitas et altitudo animi quae dicitur.

Neither must we listen to those who think that one should indulge in violent anger against one’s political enemies and imagine that such is the attitude of a great-spirited, brave man. For nothing is more commendable, nothing more becoming in a pre-eminently great man than courtesy and forbearance. Indeed, in a free people, where all enjoy equal rights before the law, we must school ourselves to affability and what is called “mental poise.”

Seneca (Clem. 2, 3): clementia est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi, vel lenitas … in constituendis poenis. [Written to Nero!]

Shakespeare (Merchant of Venice, 173ff):

The quality of mercy is not strained.

It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven

Upon the place beneath. It is twice blessed:

It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.

'Tis mightiest in the mightiest. It becomes

The thronèd monarch better than his crown.

His scepter shows the force of temporal power,

The attribute to awe and majesty

Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings,

But mercy is above this sceptered sway.

It is enthronèd in the hearts of kings.

It is an attribute to God himself.

And earthly power doth then show likest God’s

When mercy seasons justice.